The Olympia Washington Kiwanis members and their friends have cost the Washington State taxpayers over $50 million dollars (so far), because of their willful ignorance of long term, merciless and well known, child abuse that occurred at the Olympia Kiwanis Boys Ranch.

October 2006 note: This Olympia Kiwanis stuff is old news. I've left this information on the web, because I like the thought that someone will say to one of these Kiwanis friends or members: "Grandma, (Grandpa), are you still friends with those Olympia Kiwanians?"

Back to the2001 or 1999 or 1997 or 1995 Washington State Employees Salaries List
Back to the beginning OKBR Home Page(http://lbloom.net/indexok.html)


 
 


Breuer v. Fourre, 76 Wn.2d 582, 458 P.2d 168 (1969).

 CITESEARCH


1969


       [No. 40046.   Department One.    August 28, 1969.]
    WILLIAM J. BREUER et al., Respondents, v. EVERETT FOURRE
                     et al., Appellants.*


[1] Counties-Officers-Exercise of Power-Conduct of Prior Incumbents-
    Effect. A board of county commissioners is not denied the
    right to exercise a power given to it by statute and implemented
    by ordinance merely because former boards chose not to use it.
[2] Counties-Officers-Arbitrary and Capricious Action-Definition.
    Action by a board of county commissioners is arbitrary and
    capricious only if taken willfully and unreasonably, without
    consideration and in disregard of facts and circumstances.
[3] Counties-Highways-Public Dedication of Roads Power to Require
    in Plats. A board of county commissioners may require public
    dedication of the roads on a proposed plat, as a condition for
    the approval of that plat.

    Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston
County, No. 39209, D. J. Cunningham, J., entered August
29, 1967. Reversed.
    Action for injunctive relief. Defendant appeals from a
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.


    Harold R. Koch, Fred D. Gentry, and Hugh Judd, for
appellants.
    Lynch & Lynch, for respondents.


  LEAHY


    LEAHY, J.**-This case presents a single issue for our
determination: Did the Thurston County Commissioners act

    *Reported in 458 P.2d 168.
    [3] See 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Dedication SS 43.

    **Justice Leahy is serving as a justice pro tempore of the
Supreme Court pursuant to Const. art. 4, SS 2 (a) (amendment 38).

Aug. 1969            BREUER v. FOURRE                 583

arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to approve a plat
submitted by the respondents, William J. Breuer and Dean
F. Norton?
  On April 5, 1967, the respondents, land developers of an
area called Driftwood Valley Camp, applied for approval of
subdivision No. 3 of the camp. The appellants rejected the
application, contending that the streets did not meet the
minimum standards of 60 feet and that a bridge crossing
the Deschutes River to the subdivision was not wide
enough to permit 2-way traffic. Respondents then filed a
complaint in superior court, asking that the court order the
commissioners to accept the plat on the grounds that the
said commissioners had acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in not approving the plat. The order was granted by the
lower court and the commissioners now appeal.
  Based on the authority granted the board in RCW
58.16.040 the following ordinances were duly adopted in
1962 with regard to the platting of any land outside the
corporate limits of any town or city of Thurston County:
    18.08.010 Streets and lots. All streets shall have a
  minimum width of sixty feet unless otherwise directed by
  the county commissioners . . .
    18.04.030 Variances. (a) Where the county commissioners
  find extraordinary hardship may result from strict
  compliance with those regulations, it may vary the
  regulations so that substantial justice may be done and
  the public interest secured; provided that such variations
  will not have the effect of nullifying the intent and
  purpose of the comprehensive plan or these regulations.
  Subdivision No. 1 of the Driftwood Valley Camp was approved
in August, 1963, and subdivision No. 2 wasapproved in
February, 1964. Neither of these subdivisions met the
requirement of the ordinance that the roads be at least
60 feet in width.
  When subdivision No. 3 was later submitted for approval,
a new board of county commissioners was in office, with
only one commissioner, George F. Yantis Jr., having been
on the prior board which approved subdivisions No. 1 and
No. 2. This new board rejected the subdivision No. 3 plat on
the ground that not only were the roads of less than 60 feet

584                BREUER v. FOURRE               76 Wn.2d

in width, but to gain access to it, one must cross over a
bridge which, because of its limited width, could handle
only 1-way traffic. Respondents contend that the board
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to accept
subdivision No. 3, particularly since the former board had
approved the other two subdivisions.
   [1] Is the current board of commissioners to be denied
the right to exercise a valid power given to it because,
among other matters, a former board failed to exercise its
right to impose certain restrictions? We think the answer
is no. The current board was exercising a power given to
it by statute and implemented by ordinance and such power
cannot be denied the present board simply because former
boards chose not to use it.
   Specific legislative authority is given to county
commissioners to set regulations of zoning and platting in RCW
58.16.040. See also Jones v. Town of Woodway, 70 Wn.2d 977,
425 P.2d 904 (1967).
   [2] In order for it to be shown that appellants acted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner it must be shown that
they acted willfully and unreasonably, without consideration
and in disregard of facts or circumstances. Lillions v.
Gibbs, 47 Wn.2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955). Such is not the
case in the matter before us. The restrictions cannot be
said to be unreasonable in themselves and neither has the
enforcement of these regulations by this commission been
arbitrary and capricious. Since March, 1964 there have
been only two occasions when the legal restrictions
regarding the width of roads have been varied. Section
18.04.030 provides for variance of the restrictions when
the commissioners determine that an extraordinary hardship
may result from strict compliance.
   The respondents here make no argument that an extraordinary
hardship would result to them if subdivision No. 3 is not
accepted as presently constituted. They only argue that
the commissioners acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
rejecting it.
   We find that the legal restrictions and the enforcement of
them by this commission constitute a reasonable exercise of

Aug. 1969             BREUER v. FOURRE               585

the county commissioners' power and that the respondents'
argument has no merit.
  [3] Respondents further argue that the commissioners'
actions were arbitrary and capricious because none of the
roads on the plat as submitted were dedicated to public use
and that the commissioners have no right to restrict private
lands by requiring public dedication of the roads thereon.
Section 18.16.030 provides:
    The completed plat must contain a dedication which
  shall read as follows:
    "Know all men by these presents that we, the
  undersigned _________ owners in fee simple of the land hereby
  platted, hereby declare this plat and dedicate to the use
  of the public forever, all streets, avenues, places and
  sewer easements or whatever public property there is
  shown on plat and the use thereof for any and all public
  purposes not inconsistent with the use thereof for public
  highway purposes; also, the right to make all necessary
  slopes for cuts or fills upon the lots, blocks, tracts, etc.,
  shown on this plat in the reasonable original grading of
  all streets, avenues, places, etc., shown thereon."
  Consequently, from the platting regulations above it is
obvious that the respondents, in order to submit their plat
and have it approved, must dedicate to public use the
streets in the plat.
  We hold that appellants have not acted arbitrarily or
capriciously, but in accordance with their duly constituted
authority.
  The judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed.

  HUNTER, C. J., WEAVER, HAMILTON, and NEILL, JJ.,
concur.

 
 


Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973).

 CITESEARCH


1973


754                   LOVELESS v. YANTIS                    Sept. 1973
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

        [No. 42706.  En Banc.     September 6, 1973.]
      MORRIS J. LOVELESS et al., Respondents, v. GEORGE F.
              YANTIS, JR., et al., Appellants.


[1] Parties-Intervention-Interest in Subject Matter-Appeal From
    Administrative Decision. A party has an interest in the subject of a
    judicial review of administrative action, for purposes of CR 24(a)
    permitting intervention as a matter of right, when he would have
    had the right to seek judicial review himself ff the administrative
    action had been adverse to him.
      [See Ann. 46 A.L.R.2d 1059; 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law
    SS 743.]
[2] Parties-Intervention-Interest in Subject Matter-Organization.
    An organization whose members could be aggrieved by the results
    of a judicial proceeding has sufficient interest in the subject of
    the action to intervene on behalf of the members.
[3] Zoning-Enforcement-Interests of Affected Owners-Representation.
    The interests of particular property owners in sustaining a
    county's zoning decision is not necessarily represented by the
    position of the county itself which must consider the interests of
    the county as a whole.
[4] Parties-Intervention-As a Matter of Right-Interpretation of
    Rule. CR 24(a), which permits intervention as a matter of right,
    should be interpreted to allow intervention of right unless it would
    work a hardship on one of the original parties.
[5] Civil Procedure-Notice-Motions-Noncompliance. The requirement
    of CR 6(d) that motions be served 5 days before the hearing
    thereon is not jurisdictional. Failure to comply with the time
    requirement will not be fatal to the motion when other parties
    have actual notice and sufficient time to prepare for the issues to
    be considered at the hearing.
[6] Zoning - Preliminary Plat - Approval - Matters Considered.
    Although the requirements of a preliminary plat are normally limited
    by zoning enactments to general design and layout, any infirmity
    appearing on the plat which would preclude any possible approval,
    whether relating to design and layout or otherwise, will result in
    rejection of the plat.
[7] Zoning - Planned Unit Development - Density Restrictions. A
    planned unit development, as opposed to a planned area development,
    must apply applicable zoning density rules individually to
    each structure in the development.
[8] Zoning-Judicial Review-Administrative Record-Necessity. The
    courts cannot determine the legality of action by a planning
    commission or zoning authority unless there is a complete and
    accurate transcript of the records and proceedings before such
    bodies.
[9] Environment-SEPA-Major Action-What Constitutes. A "major

Sept. 1973            LOVELESS v. YANTIS                     755
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

    action," for purposes of the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971
    which requires an impact statement whenever major governmental
    action significantly affects the environment, exists whenever there
    is a discretionary, nonduplicative stage of governmental approval
    of a private construction activity. There is discretion whenever
    choice exists however narrow or limited the statutory criteria may
    be, and the action is nonduplicative if all environmental issues
    have not previously been considered or new information or
    developments have intervened since the last prior major action.
[10] Zoning-Environment-SEPA-Preliminary Plat-Environmental
    Impact. The fact that a preliminary plat of a development is
    tentative and does not represent the complete plan does not
    eliminate the need for an environmental impact statement if major
    action significantly affecting the environment occurs with regard to
    such plat. All environmental issues raised by the preliminary plat,
    even if it shows no more than the general street layout, should be
    studied and evaluated at the time of its submission.

  Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for
Thurston County, Nos. 42706, 42738, Warner Poyhonen, J.,
entered January 25, 1973. Reversed.
  Action to review a zoning decision of a county commission.
Defendants appeal from a judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs.


  Smith Troy, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jane Dowdle
Smith, Deputy, for appellants George F. Yantis et al.
  John S. Robinson and Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell,
Malanca, Peterson, O'Hern & Johnson, by James A. Furber,
for appellants Cooper Point Association et al.
  Ernest L. Meyer, for respondents.
  Charles B. Roe, Jr., amicus curiae.


  UTTER


  UTTER, J.-This is an appeal from a superior court
judgment which granted preliminary approval to a plat filed by
Morris J. Loveless, affecting property on Cooper Point in
Thurston County. The court declared the Thurston County
commissioners' refusal to grant approval arbitrary and
capricious.
  The basic issues raised are: (1) whether the

756                  LOVELESS v. YANTIS                   Sept. 1973
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

intervenor-appellants /1  are entitled as a matter of right to
intervene; (2) whether the offered plat on its face violates the
county zoning ordinances; (3) whether the incomplete record of
the county proceedings on this matter brought before the
court was inadequate to support the court's judgment; and
(4) whether an environmental impact statement pursuant
to RCW 43.21 is a necessary prerequisite for preliminary
approval of the plat.
   Each issue is answered in the affirmative and we reverse
the trial court.
  The property in question is on a glacially-formed
peninsula at the southern extremity of Puget Sound, known as
Cooper Point. The point is approximately 4 miles wide at
its base, narrows to less than a mile at its northern tip, and
extends 7 1/2 miles into the salt water. There is extensive
marine life and a wide assortment of vegetation and
wildlife. The peninsula rises steeply from the coastal
beaches and its interior is primarily a rolling terrace.
  Recently a new state college has located toward the
point's base. The respondent-Loveless' project, called "By
the Sea", is proposed for the narrow tip of the point and
would consist of multi-family condominiums.
  On or about March 3, 1972, respondent filed an
application with the Thurston County Planning Department

(pursuant to county ordinance No. 3829), for preliminary
approval of this plat. A public hearing was held by the
Thurston County Planning Commission on the application and a
recommendation that the plat be denied was made on April
27, 1972. The recommendation failed to provide the
required reasons for denial and when the county commissioners
received the matter (pursuant to RCW 58.17.100), they
consulted with the applicant and by mutual

---------------
   1 The intervenors are the Cooper Point Association, composed of
Cooper Point area owners and residents who seek to insure the orderly
development of the point so that the area's unique amenities will not
suffer; the Cooper's Point Water Company, Inc., composed of
landowners sharing in a common well and water system on the point; and
Katherine Partlow Draham, who owns and operates a farm adjacent to
a portion of the platted property here at issue.

Sept. 1973            LOVELESS v. YANTIS                    757
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

agreement returned it to the planning commission for further
consideration and with instruction to state specific reasons
if the plat was again rejected.
  A subcommittee of the planning commission recommended
preliminary approval; however, the planning commission
referred the matter back to committee for preparation
of an environmental impact statement. At this point
in the planning commission's review, respondent asked the
county commissioners to reconsider the matter, arguing that
no environmental impact statement was required. A public
hearing was held by the commissioners on August 9, 1972,
and an order denying the application for the preliminary
approval of the plat was entered on August 14, 19 72.
  Respondent appealed this order to superior court. The
Cooper Point Association and Cooper's Point Water
Company, Inc. appeared at an October 9, 1972 hearing
requesting permission to intervene. They were denied intervention
but permitted to submit briefs and argue the merits of the
case as amici curiae. Court then recessed, and before
reconvening, Mrs. Katherine Partlow Draham filed a separate
motion to intervene. On December 6, 1972, all motions to
intervene were again denied, but all were permitted to
argue as amici curiae. The court then found the failure of
the commissioners to provide any reason for refusing to
grant preliminary approval to the plat constituted an
arbitrary and capricious decision and granted the preliminary
approval sought.
  Appellant-commissioners began an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, while the intervenor-appellants petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari authorizing them to
intervene. By order of the Chief Justice the petition was
granted, those seeking to intervene were permitted to
appear on appeal, and the two appeal processes were
consolidated into this review.
   The Cooper Point Association, the Cooper's Point Water
Company, and Katherine Partlow Draham should have
been allowed to intervene as a matter of right. This

758                   LOVELESS v. YANTIS              Sept. 1973
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

question is controlled by Civil Rule for Superior Court 24 (a). /2
The trial court found those seeking to intervene were not
timely, had no claim as a matter of right, and were not
necessary or proper parties to the cause. We find it
necessary to rule only on the issue of intervention as a
matter of right.
  CR 24 (a) requires an intervenor to show that he claims
an interest relating to the property that is the subject of
the action; that disposition of the action may impair his
ability to protect that interest; that his interest is not being
adequately represented by existing parties; and that his
appeal is timely.
  [1] Each of the intervenors has the necessary interest
in the property. The interest of the Cooper's Point Water
Association and Katherine Partlow Draham is direct as
property owners "who feel themselves aggrieved" and who
would have had a right to appeal the ruling of the
commission had it been adverse to them. They could, in addition,
have shown special damages by way of diminution in value
of their property resulting from the action of defendants.
Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn.2d 781,167 P.2d 412 (1946).
  [2] The Cooper Point Association, likewise, has an
interest in the property. An organization whose members are
injured may represent those members in proceedings for
judicial review. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428, 9 L.
Ed. 2d 405, 83 S. Ct. 328 (1963). With the members of the
association here all residents of the area affected, the
association has a direct enough interest to challenge the
administrative action. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
31 L. Ed. 2d 636, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972).
  The intervenors are likewise in a position where the

---------------
   2 CR 24(a). "Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers
an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims
an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties."

Sept. 1973            LOVELESS v. YANTIS                        759
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

disposition of the action may impair their ability to protect
their interests. Our ruling regarding the nature of a preliminary
plat establishes that it is not merely an insignificant
stage of the proceedings without real consequence. The
failure to litigate environmental and zoning issues at this
stage could result in decisions being reached by the county that
have a binding impact on intervenors without their consent
or participation.
  [3] Intervenor-appellants are not per se adequately
represented by the fact that the county is appealing. Actual
proof in this case of that fact is shown by the county's
failure to urge any of the grounds upon which we base our
ruling. /3  In addition, the county must consider the interests
of all the residents of the county, where the affected
property owners represent a more sharply focused and
sometimes antagonistic viewpoint to that of the county as a
whole. Herzog v. Pocatello, 82 Ida. 505, 356 P.2d 54 (1960);
Bredberg v. Wheaton, 24 Ill. 2d 612, 182 N.E.2d 742 (1962).
  [4] The motions to intervene were also timely. CR
24 (a) should be interpreted to allow an intervention of
right unless it would work a hardship on one of the original
parties. Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. App. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777, 89 L. Ed. 621, 65 S. Ct. 190
(1944); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Taylor, 399 Pa. 324, 159
A.2d 692 (1960).
  [5] The failure of intervenors to follow Civil Rule for
Superior Court 6 (d), requiring service of motions 5 days
before the time specified for the hearing, was not fatal in
this case. The rule is not jurisdictional. Where the party had
actual notice and time to prepare to meet the questions
raised by the motions of the adversary, deviation from the
time limit may be permissible. Herron v. Herron, 255 F.2d

---------------
   3 The county solely contended that the commissioners' decision was
not arbitrary and capricious and that if so, the trial court must remand
the matter back to the commissioners rather than itself granting the
preliminary approval. Moreover, on the issue of whether a zoning
violation exists in this case, the county and intervenors are at odds on
whether the plat even raises a zoning question.

760                  LOVELESS v. YANTIS               Sept. 1973
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

589 (5th Cir. 1958); 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure SS 1169, at 644 n.30 (1969).
  There was ample notice and time to prepare here. The
appearance of intervenors as amici curiae gave
respondent adequate opportunity to know the issues raised and be
prepared to meet them. The motion to intervene is granted
in this appeal and as a matter of right should have been
granted in the trial.
  Respondent's submitted plat, on its face, violates the
existing Thurston County zoning ordinance (No. 3744) in two
respects. First, the proposal contemplates structures which
are not permitted in a suburban-agriculture use district
like northern Cooper Point, and it contemplates a "Planned
Area Development" which is also not permitted.
  A preliminary plat is defined by Thurston County
ordinance No. 3829, section 2, as
    A neat and approximate drawing of the proposed layout
  of streets, blocks, lots and *other elements* of a plat or
  subdivision which shall furnish the basis for the
  Planning Commission's approval or disapproval of the general
  layout of the plat or subdivision.
(Italics ours.) This is similar to RCW 58.17.020 (4). The
documents filed by respondent show not only the proposed
streets but the height and location of the structures to be
served by these streets. The plat layout, therefore, related
elements of the proposed subdivision, apparently in an effort
to submit a "Planned Area Development."
  Some of the proposed structures in the plat were 40, 50,
and 110 feet high. Given this detail, the administrative
body reviewing the plat was on notice that possible
violations of the zoning prohibition that "No building or
structure shall exceed two (2) stories or thirty-five (35) feet
in height, whichever is less" in a suburban-agriculture zone
existed. Respondent contends any height violations are
immaterial at the preliminary approval stage of a plat,
since a preliminary plat is only an approximate drawing of
streets, blocks and lots with the question of zoning
compliance deferred to a later stage. We disagree.

Sept. 1973            LOVELESS v. YANTIS                     761
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

 [6] It is true that a purpose of a preliminary plat is to
secure approval of the street layout and location "design"
of a proposal. Essentially, the plat provides information not
specified in ordinance regulations. 3 A. Rathkopf, The Law
of Planning and Zoning, ch. 71, SS 5 1972). The importance
of this preliminary approval procedure is indicated by
Rathkopf at page 71-34:
     Where this two-step procedure is in effect,
   consideration of the preliminary plat must result either in
   its approval as submitted, or a statement that it will be
   approved if it is modified in the manner specified by the
   planning board, or in *its disapproval where conditions or
   infirmities appear or exist that would preclude any
   possibility of approval*.
     The planning board cannot modify the preliminary
   plat and then disapprove a final plat conforming to the
   plat modified as prescribed by the board.
(Italics ours.)
  Therefore, since any approval or modification by the
reviewers of a preliminary plat is binding where infirmities
appear that would preclude any possible approval (such as
clear zoning violations), it is incumbent upon the planning
body to reject the plat. The planning commission is
directed when considering preliminary plats of proposed
subdivisions
   to assure conformance of the proposed subdivision to the
   general purposes of the comprehensive plan and to
   planning standards and specifications as adopted by the
   . . . county.
RCW 58.17.100.
  Here, the plat's layout was more than just a drawing of
streets and lot lines, and the indicated height of the
proposed structures, violative of the height regulations, may
not be approved.
   It appears that respondent proceeded under section 11A
of county platting ordinance No. 3829 which sets forth
procedures for those seeking a "Planned Area Development"
(P.A.D.). The pertinent county zoning ordinance (No.

762                   LOVELESS v. YANTIS              Sept. 1973
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

3744) provides no authority for a P.A.D. in a suburban-
agriculture use district.
  [7] A "Planned Unit Development" (P.U.D.), which is
significantly different from the requested P.A.D., is
permitted by the zoning ordinance. A P.U.D. has been defined
as a self-contained community
  built within a zoning district, with the rules of density
  controlling not only the relation of private dwellings to
  open space, but also the relation of homes to commercial
  establishments such as theaters, hotels, restaurants, and
  quasi-commercial uses such as schools and churches.
Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 630, 241
A.2d 81 (1968). A P.A.D., on the other hand, permits a
group of structures to be built together in a more pleasing
and practical manner than might be permitted under the
restrictions of a subdivision and platting ordinance. Such
an ordinance does not allow structures unauthorized by
zoning regulations. The lack of enabling regulations for a
P.U.D. is also fatal to the preliminary plat in this case.
  We therefore conclude the plat cannot be granted
preliminary approval since on its face it violates the controlling
zoning ordinances.
  The essence of the trial court's ruling was that the
commissioners' decision was arbitrary and capricious. We find
it impossible to intelligently review the commissioners'
decision because of an incomplete and inadequate record.
  [8] Courts reviewing the proceedings of planning
commissions and county commissioners in zoning cases are
normally restricted to a consideration of the record made
before those groups. Bishop v. Houghton, 69 Wn.2d 786, 420
P.2d 368 (1966); RCW 58.17.100. Incomplete records make
appellate review impossible and where a "full and complete
transcript of the records and proceedings had in said cause"
is ordered by the superior court and cannot be furnished,
the actions of those boards have been vacated. Beach v.
Board of Adjustment, 73 Wn.2d 343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968).
Such is the case here.
  The hearings before the planning commission could not

Sept. 1973            LOVELESS v. YANTIS                     763
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

be accurately reproduced as the tapes made were unclear.
The tapings of the county commissioners' hearings were
also too unclear to permit a complete, accurate
reproduction. We are thus presented with a conspicuously
incomplete record to review. See Nesqually Mill Co. v.
Taylor, 1 Wash. Terr. 1 (1854).
   The problem is similar to that noted in Battaglia v.
O'Brien, 59 N.J. Super. 154, 173, 157 A.2d 508 (1960), where
the court noted:
   in view of the unavailability of the basic records, we are
   in no position to determine whether there has been
   "strict conformity with the procedural and substantive
   terms of the statute," nor are we able to determine
   whether the municipal action was arbitrary, capricious or
   a manifest abuse of discretionary authority.
In an identical quandary, the court in Russo v. Stevens, 10
Misc. 2d 530, 532, 173 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1958), stated:
   no adequate or intelligent judicial review is possible
   unless all the essential evidentiary material upon which the
   administrative agency predicates a quasi-judicial
   determination is in the record and before the court.
There is thus no legal basis by which the trial court below
or we on appellate review can determine whether the
commissioners' rejection of the respondent's plat was unlawful.
   The trial court concluded an environmental impact
statement was unnecessary for the preliminary approval of
respondent's plat. Although our resolution of the preceding
issues does not require us to necessarily reach this question,
we do so for the guidance of the parties in light of the
possible revision and resubmission of the plat.
   [9] The facts of this case necessitate an environmental
impact statement pursuant to the State Environmental
Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA), RCW 43.21C, because the decision
to grant preliminary approval of the plat for the
contemplated project constitutes a major action significantly
affecting the quality of the environment. Eastlake
Community Council v. Roanoke Associates, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 475,

764                   LOVELESS v. YANTIS               Sept. 1973
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

487-98, 513 P.2d 36 (1973); Stempel v. Department of
Water Resources, 82 Wn.2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973).
  In Eastlake and Stempel we recognized the vigorous
mandate the legislature directed at governmental bodies to
evaluate environmental and ecological factors in their
major actions. The case now before us reveals the ideal
factual setting for early, and thereby meaningful,
environmental review.
  No party to this appeal asserts that the project will not
significantly affect the environment. Nor is there any
question but that the preliminary approval of a plat involves
discretion and in this case is nonduplicative. Therefore, the
issuance of a preliminary approval to the respondent's plat
constitutes a "major action" significantly affecting the
environment so as to require an environmental impact
statement.
  In Eastlake, at pages 490-92, we set forth the elements
necessary to establish a "major action." We therein
indicated that if the governmental action "involved a
discretionary nonduplicative stage" of the government's
approval, SEPA would apply where the considered project
significantly affects the environment. The preliminary
approval of the plat is a discretionary act not mandatory
under the Thurston County ordinance, since this governmental
action could have resulted in a denial of the plat.
  Where choice exists there is discretion and the fact that
previous to SEPA the choice could be solely based on
narrow or limited evaluative points set forth in an ordinance
or statute is immaterial. "It is no answer to this finding of
discretion in the renewal process that the department is
bound and limited in its considerations to the permit
renewal provisions of the Seattle code. Such a claim was
raised and rejected in Stempel . . ." 82 Wn.2d at 492.
  We emphasize, however, that not all discretionary actions
trigger SEPA provisions. Not only must the action significantly
affect the environment, but it must be nonduplicative.
Therefore, if environmental issues have previously been
considered or no new information or developments

Sept 1973             LOVELESS v. YANTIS                      765
                 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023

have intervened since the last "major action", a new or
revised impact statement is not necessary. SEPA does not
mandate bureaucratic redundancy but only that the
heretofore ignored environmental considerations become part of
normal decision making on major actions.
   [10] The only argument raised against requiring an
environmental review here is that it would be premature, as
this stage is very early in the project's life. This contention
was rejected in Eastlake where we stated, at page 492:
   [I]t is no answer to the application of SEPA, to claim
   the renewal of a building permit is a modest exercise in a
   long process. Governmental action in approving a
   long-term project may occur at various intervals during the
   life of the project with various degrees of significance. It
   is unquestionable that numerous, modest and common
   governmental actions may be as damaging to the
   environment as a single, vigorous and critical action.
We further emphasized, at page 489: "There may exist
several phases or stages of decision-making for any one
project and each stage, if 'major', requires an
environmental impact statement."
   Each stage of governmental action may focus on distinct
environmental concerns, thus providing for a more narrow
evaluation. In this case,  it will be of benefit to the public
and the developer that an environmental review can be
made on the "design" matters revealed in preliminary
plats. Choices exist and crisis decision making and
catastrophic environmental damage can be avoided by early
deliberation here. Also, given this early stage, the
application of SEPA would result in minimizing investment costs
if the decision is abandonment or alteration.
   The need for an early inquiry into environmental
matters at the platting stage is emphasized by RCW 58.17.110
which sets forth the responsibility of the county legislative
body on these matters. It requires that body to determine,
among other things, if "the public use and interest will be
served by the platting of such subdivision . . . ." For
either the planning commission or county commissioners to

766                 KJELLMAN v. RICHARDS                 Sept. 1973
                 82 Wn.2d 766, 514 P.2d 134

determine this question, they must have before them, in
major actions, an environmental review of the project. As
previously indicated, it may well be that at the preliminary
stage of plat submission, all environmental impacts and
ramifications cannot be known or answered. Yet, the
environmental concerns raised by the plat must be reviewed.
If only the street layout is indicated, its impact should be
studied. In this case, enough details of the broad project
can be readily gleaned from the submitted plat to provide a
broader environmental review on the overall project itself.
   We recognized in Eastlake that SEPA is designed to
avoid crisis decision making by requiring meaningful early
evaluations of environmental matters. This state policy
recognizes that the threat today to the environment is not
its sudden destruction but its progressive degradation.
Environmental deliberation, not default, is mandated by SEPA
and such deliberation is required here.
   The order of the superior court is reversed.

   HALE, C.J., FINLEY, ROSELLINI, HUNTER, HAMILTON,
STAFFORD, WRIGHT, and BRACHTENBACH, JJ., concur.






 







 

Below is an e-mail I received from a former Olympia, Washington resident.

From: ~~~~~~~~@aol.com
To: Louis Bloom manaco@whidbey.net
Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 1999 11:34 AM
Subject: OKBR
Just came across your pages and felt the urge to respond... In the early 80's (81-83) I was at the OKBR frequently as a young kid walking to/from school, I became friends with some of the boys. At one point a small boy confided to me that he was being raped by another boy in the home. The abusing boy talked about it openly!
Days later I walked the victim to OPD where we both gave statements. Later that evening I began to receive these incredibly threatening phone calls from a woman employee of the ranch who's name I believe was Paulette at my home. She kept calling over and over screaming at me calling me names. It was horrible. I thought I was helping someone. Nothing came of it. Then all these years later, it all comes out ... one of the boys that I had known there left as a young adult and still couldn't get it together, he eventually killed himself. As an adult now I don't often think back to those times but it still saddens me. All those boys that needed a safe nurturing place to be, and how many of them were better off for having been taken there? It's not about money. It cost these boys their lives, their souls, their trust. Those people who knew, who didn't care, they should feel such shame. Just my opinion.

From: louis a bloom manaco@whidbey.net
To: ~~~~~~~@aol.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 1999 7:30 PM
Subject: Re: OKBR
thanks for your e-mail. from what i've read, dshs, the olympia police department, and other "authorities" didn't consider child on child rape to be against the law. it was considered "normal experimentation". The "paulette" you mention, may have been Collette Queener who was an assistant director at the OKBR. Collette, OKBR Director Tom Van Woerdan, and OKBR counselor Laura Rambo Russell were half-heartedly charged, with failing to report a crime.The charges were dismissed by the judges on technicalities. The lawyer who represented Collette Queener said, (Nov. 14, 1996 Olympian), that it was a "witch hunt", and that " a more innocent person (than Queener) you could not have for a client. She's an ex-nun ..... I don't see how you could view her in an evil or negative light."
I congratulate you for doing the right thing, when all those adults looked the other way. I repeat on most pages that the " OKBR has cost the Washington State taxpayers over $35 million dollars (so far)", because I think most people don't care about the kids involved, but they may care that it has cost them (taxpayers) money.
louis bloom

There were many obvious and long-term warnings about the 1970-94 child abusing Olympia Kiwanis Boys Ranch.

  • DSHS knew since at least 1977.
  • The OKBR staff certainly knew.
  • The abused kids told staff, schools, counselors, police, caseworkers, therapists, ect.., about their abuse at the OKBR, but nobody investigated.
  • Olympia Police Chief Wurner came to an Olympia Kiwanis meeting in 1986 and told the Kiwanis about the troubles at the OKBR. Chief Wurner was ignored. Maybe he should have done more, but he probably wanted to keep his job.
  • It was well know by the Thurston County courts. These kids were constantly in and out of the Thurston County legal system.
  • The OKBR was written about in the Kiwanis Komments newsletters, and the Kiwanis Board Ranch minutes.
  • All the OKBR Board Members had a legal oversight of the OKBR.
  • Were all Olympia Kiwanis Attorneys & Judges and/or Politicians uninformed?
  • It's amazing how blissfully ignorant some people were about the OKBR. You can read about their guiltlessness in some of their Washington State Patrol and Office of Special Investigation statements.
  • Here's Wa St Patrol Olympia Kiwanis member lists of 1987, 1990, 1994
  • Here is a 49 page index of 5,223 pages of documents that the WSP collected about the OKBR. Anybody can order any of those public documents by following the instructions on that page.
  • The OKBR sent kids for weekend visits to child abusers who donated land to the Kiwanis. The Kiwanians sold the land in 1993 for $125,000.
  • Can the Olympian Newspaper claim ignorance?
    manaco@whidbey.net