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The opinion below from a November 2002 Washington State Court of Appeals opinion, has ruled, (among other things), that public employees names are not private or secret. (I have highlighted, in purple, some of the quotes from this opinion, that I think are significant.)

Court of Appeals Division I
                               State of Washington

                            Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number:       48161-4-I
Title of Case:       King County, Respondent-Cross-Appellant
                     v.
                     William A. Sheehan Iii, Appellant/Cross-Respondent
File Date:           11/12/2002


                                SOURCE OF APPEAL
                                ----------------
Appeal from Superior Court of King County
Docket No:      002201702
Judgment or order under review
Date filed:     01/26/2001
Judge signing:  Hon. Michael J. Fox


                                     JUDGES
                                     ------
Authored by Faye C. Kennedy
Concurring: William W. Baker
            Ronald E. Cox


                                COUNSEL OF RECORD
                                -----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s)
            Elena L. Garella
            Ste 301
            927 N Northlake Way
            Seattle, WA  98103

Counsel for Respondent(s)
            Janine E. Joly
            Deputy Pros Atty
            E 550 King Co Courthouse
            516 Third Ave
            Seattle, WA  98104

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT INTERVENOR(S)
            Patrick D. Brown
            6112 24th Ave NE
            Seattle, WA  98115

Amicus Curiae on behalf of The Media Associations
            Michael J. Killeen
            Davis Wright Tremaine
            2600 Century Square
            1501 4th Ave.
            Seattle, WA  98101-1688

            Michele L. Earl-Hubbard
            Davis Wright Tremaine
            Ste 2600
            1501 4th Ave
            Seattle, WA  98101-1688

            Alison P. Howard
            Davis Wright Tremaine
            2600 Century Square
            1501 4th Avenue
            Seattle, WA  98101

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

KING COUNTY,                                     )
                                                 ) NO. 48161-4-I
                  Respondent/                    )
                  Cross-Appellant,               ) DIVISION ONE
                                                 )
         v.                                      )
                                                 )
WILLIAM A. SHEEHAN III,                          )
                                                 )
                  Cross-Respondent,              )
                                                 )
               and                               ) PUBLISHED OPINION
                                                 )
AARON ROSENSTEIN,                                )
                                                 )
                  Appellant/Intervener.          ) FILED

KENNEDY, J.  --  Appellants William A. Sheehan III and Aaron Rosenstein
maintain controversial websites that are critical of police agencies in
Washington.  They submitted public records act requests seeking a list of
the full names and ranks of every police officer employed by King County.
The County refused the request and filed suit to enjoin disclosure,
contending that the information was exempt from disclosure because it would
hinder effective law enforcement and infringe on the police officers' right
to privacy.  The trial court granted the County's suit in part and denied
it in part, ordering the County to provide only the last names and ranks of
all King County police officers.  In a subsequent proceeding, a different
judge awarded attorney fees to appellants but denied statutory penalties on
the ground that the County acted in good faith when it denied the
disclosure request.  Both sides appeal.  Sheehan and Rosenstein contend,
and we agree, that the trial court erred by refusing to order the County to
disclose the full names of the police officers it employs.  They also
contend, and we agree, that there is no good-faith exemption from the
statutory penalty.  These rulings essentially moot the County's cross-
appeal, in which the County contends that the trial court erred by
requiring that even the officers' last names be disclosed and by awarding
Sheehan and Rosenstein the full amount of their attorney fees.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's rulings insofar as they conflict
with this opinion, and remand for entry of an order requiring the County to
disclose the full names and ranks of the police officers the county
employs.1  We also direct the trial court to impose a statutory penalty of
at least $5 and not more than $100 for each day that Sheehan and Rosenstein
have not been provided with the records they sought, provided however, that
no penalty shall be imposed for the days from June 7, 2001, to the date
this court issues its mandate, a commissioner of this court having stayed
that portion of the trial court's order requiring disclosure of the last
names and ranks of all police officers hired by the County, pending the
outcome of this appeal.  We award Sheehan and Rosenstein their reasonable
attorney fees and costs for their appeal and for defending against the
County's cross-appeal.
FACTS

In May 2000, William A. Sheehan III submitted public records requests to
local
police agencies throughout the Puget Sound area asking for a list of the
full names of every law enforcement officer and attorney employed by each
of the agencies, along with job titles and pay scales for each position.
Almost all of the police agencies complied with Sheehan's requests.
The King County Sheriff's Office responded to Sheehan's request within the
required five-day period by acknowledging the request and informing him
that it was being reviewed.  The Sheriff's Office did provide some portions
of the information Sheehan requested, including pay scales for each rank
within the Sheriff's Office.  In an attempt to learn what information might
be obtainable by a person who had access to the full names of law
enforcement officers, a Sheriff's Office employee determined that it was
possible to obtain officers' home addresses and other personal information
via the public access section of the King County Assessor's Office.
The King County Prosecutor, acting on behalf of the Sheriff, denied the
remainder of Sheehan's request by letter dated July 20, 2000.  The letter
stated that the list of officers' full names was exempt under RCW
42.17.310(1)(b) because it "would allow access to additional information
regarding individual employees that is both highly offensive and not of
legitimate concern to the public."  Clerk's Papers at 34.  The letter also
stated that the list was exempt under RCW 42.17.310(1)(d) because "release
of the list will hinder effective law enforcement because it will make
identifying information beyond just the names of officers accessible."  Id.
Accordingly, the County refused to release any portion of the names of its
officers, except for the Sheriff himself; neither did it release officer
ranks at that time.2
Sheehan threatened to bring suit under the public records act unless the
County released the requested records.  In response, the County filed a
complaint and motion to enjoin examination of records, repeating its
assertions that the list of the full names of all law enforcement officers
employed by King County was exempt under RCW 42.17.310(1)(b) and (d), and
also contending that the release of officers' names would threaten their
safety and privacy and would compromise undercover operations.  Sheehan
answered and filed a counterclaim for release of the requested records and
for attorney fees and statutory penalties.
After Sheehan was served with the County's complaint and motion to enjoin,
King County received a public records request from Aaron Rosenstein, also
seeking a list of law enforcement officers in King County.  The County
responded to this request in the same manner as it had responded to
Sheehan's request:  it sent a letter denying Rosenstein access to the list
and explaining its position regarding the applicable exemptions.
Rosenstein then moved to intervene in the County's lawsuit against Sheehan.
The County did not oppose the motion, and Rosenstein was allowed to
intervene.
It is undisputed that both Sheehan and Rosenstein run controversial
internet web
sites that are highly critical of police, and that Mr. Sheehan, at least,
has previously posted identifying information regarding King County police
officers, including their home addresses, on his web site.  The record
contains a declaration from an undercover officer (identified in the
declaration only by his or her initials, "R. T.") stating that after one
suspect was arrested as the result of a recent undercover police operation,
an undercover officer's car description and license plate were published on
an internet web site for other suspects to read.  The declaration does not
allege that this information was published on either Sheehan or
Rosenstein's web site; rather, the declaration illustrates the problems
that police already face in the internet age, and the County's concerns
that this kind of interference with undercover operations could happen with
more frequency if it is required to disclose the full names of all of its
police officers, some of whom are working undercover at any given time.
A judge of the King County Superior Court decided the merits of the case at
a hearing on November 17, 2000.  The court made the following conclusions
of law:
1.        The court must read the Public Disclosure Act and the Freedom of
Information Act together and must consider public policy;
2.        Under the circumstances of this case and based on defendant
William Sheehan's statements regarding his intended use of the information,
the Court must balance the interests of disclosure with the interests in
effective law enforcement;
3.        The Court concludes the following relief is authorized under RCW
42.17.310(1)(d) and the Court's ruling is based solely on that exemption.

Clerk's Papers at 155.
The court granted the County's motion in part and denied it in part,
ordering the County to provide the surnames and ranks of all King County
police officers, but allowing it to withhold the officers' first and middle
names.  Sheehan and Rosenstein moved for reconsideration, which the trial
court denied.
The remainder of the case was then assigned to a different trial court
judge.  Sheehan and Rosenstein moved for an award of attorney fees and
penalties under RCW 42.17.340(4).  The court found that Sheehan and
Rosenstein were entitled to the full amount of requested fees, with the
exception of fees associated with the unsuccessful motion for
reconsideration and the notice of appeal.  However, the court declined to
award statutory penalties, concluding that the County had acted in good
faith when it denied the requests.
This appeal and cross-appeal followed.  We granted the motions of Allied
Daily Newspapers of Washington, Inc., Washington bureaus of the Associated
Press, and Washington Association of Broadcasters (collectively, Media
Associations) to file an amicus brief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Courts review agency denials of disclosure de novo.  RCW 42.17.340(3).
Courts review the award and amount of penalties under the abuse of
discretion standard.  Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. U.W., 114 Wn.2d
677, 683-84, 790 P.2d 604 (1990) ("PAWS I").
DISCUSSION

1.   Is a list of the full names of King County police officers exempt from
disclosure under RCW 42.17.310(1)(d) on the ground that it is "specific
intelligence information," nondisclosure of which is "essential to
effective law enforcement"?

The Public Disclosure Act was passed by initiative in 1972.  See Laws of
1973, ch. 1; RCW 42.17.  The public records portion of the act, RCW
42.17.250-.348, requires all state and local agencies to disclose any
public record upon request, unless it falls within certain specific
enumerated exemptions.  RCW 42.17.260(1).
The central purpose of the act is "nothing less than the preservation of
the most central tenets of representative government, namely, the
sovereignty of the people and the accountability to the people of public
officials and institutions."  Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. U.W., 125
Wn.2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) ("PAWS II"); RCW 42.17.251.  Our courts
have repeatedly held that the act is "a strongly worded mandate for broad
disclosure of public records."  Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 127,
580 P.2d 246 (1978); Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wn.2d 25, 31, 929 P.2d
389 (1997); PAWS II, 125 Wn.2d at 251.  Accordingly, the act's disclosure
provisions must be liberally construed, and its exemptions narrowly
construed.  RCW 42.17.251; RCW 42.17.010(11); PAWS II, 125 Wn.2d at 251;
Amren, 131 Wn.2d at 31.
Courts must take into account the policy of the act "that free and open
examination of public records is in the public interest, even though such
examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or
others."  RCW 42.17.340(3).  The agency bears the burden of proving that
refusal to disclose "is in accordance with a statute that exempts or
prohibits disclosure in whole or in part of specific information or
records."  RCW 42.17.340(1).  In addition, agencies "shall not distinguish
among persons requesting records, and such persons shall not be required to
provide information as to the purpose for the request" except under very
limited circumstances not applicable to this case.  RCW 42.17.270.  If the
requested material contains both exempt and nonexempt material, the exempt
material may be redacted but the remaining material must be disclosed.  RCW
42.17.310(2); Amren, 131 Wn.2d at 32.
The County first argues that the list of officer names is exempt because
nondisclosure is essential to effective law enforcement.  RCW
42.17.310(1)(d) exempts from disclosure:
Specific intelligence information and specific investigative records
compiled by investigative, law enforcement, and penology agencies, and
state agencies vested with the responsibility to discipline members of any
profession, the nondisclosure of which is essential to effective law
enforcement or for the protection of any person's right to privacy.

The trial court based its decision to require disclosure of only the
officers' last names on this exemption.  Neither party is content with this
ruling:  the County contends that not even the surnames of police officers
are disclosable under this exemption, while Sheehan, Rosenstein, and amici
Media Associations argue that the exemption does not apply at all.
The County does not argue that the list of officers' names constitutes an
"investigative record."  Nor should it.  Records are exempt under that
category only "if they were compiled as a result of a specific
investigation focusing with special intensity upon a particular party."
Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wn.2d 782, 792-93, 845 P.2d 995 (1993).  Instead, the
County argues that the list of names constitutes "specific intelligence
information," the nondisclosure of which is "essential to effective law
enforcement."
The act does not define the term "specific intelligence information."  In
the absence of a statutory definition, courts give words their ordinary
meaning.  Washington State Coalition for the Homeless v. D.S.H.S., 133
Wn.2d 894, 905, 949 P.2d 1291 (1997).  Courts may look to dictionary
definitions to determine ordinary meaning.  Id. at 905.  In this context,
"intelligence" may be defined as "the gathering or distribution of
information, especially secret information," or "information about an
enemy" or "the evaluated conclusions drawn from such information."  Random
House Unabridged Dictionary 990 (1993).  With the possible exception of the
names of police officers who are actively engaged in undercover operations
at the time of a request for disclosure, it is difficult to see how a list
of police officers' names could fall under these definitions.  In addition,
the exemption applies only to specific intelligence information, suggesting
an even narrower interpretation.  Other jurisdictions and courts have
narrowly defined "intelligence information" in a manner that would clearly
not include a general list of officers' names.  See, e.g., Multnomah County
Code sec. 15.551 ("{i}nformation compiled in an effort to anticipate,
prevent or monitor possible criminal activity, or compiled in a course of
investigation of known or suspected crimes"); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6 sec.
167 ("records and data compiled by a criminal justice agency for the
purpose of criminal investigation, including reports of informants,
investigators or other persons"); A.C.L.U. v. Deukmejian, 32 Cal. 3d 440,
651 P.2d 822, 827 (1982) ("intelligence information" exemption applies to
information identifying confidential sources or subjects in organized crime
records; rejecting position that exemption applies to all information
"reasonably related to criminal activity" on grounds that such an
interpretation would "effectively exclude the law enforcement function of
state and local governments from any public scrutiny").
The County has not convincingly explained why officers' names that are
routinely released on a daily basis in court, on the streets, in the media,
or to individuals on a per-incident basis are not intelligence information,
whereas a list of names released pursuant to a public records act request
by a known critic of law enforcement is intelligence information.  The
County suggests that the list of names is intelligence information because
it contains the names of undercover officers, and officers who might
someday go undercover.  But Sheehan and Rosenstein did not ask for a
breakdown of which officers are presently operating undercover and which
are not.  Neither has the County offered to provide a list with the names
of undercover officers redacted.  Moreover, to construe the "specific
intelligence information" exemption so broadly as to include the names of
officers who might someday go undercover would fly in the face of the
thrice-repeated legislative mandate that exemptions under the public
records act are to be narrowly construed.  See RCW 42.17.010(11); RCW
42.17.251; RCW 42.17.920.
In sum, the County's proposal to include law enforcement officers' names
within the "intelligence information" exemption contradicts the common-
sense definition of the term "intelligence information" and runs counter to
the act's purpose of broad disclosure of public records.  As our Supreme
Court has said in another context, "{e}xemptions from remedial legislation
. . . are narrowly construed and applied only to the situations which are
plainly and unmistakably consistent with the terms and spirit of the
legislation."  Drinkwitz v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 140 Wn.2d 291, 301,
996 P.2d 582 (2000).  Our state and local law enforcement officers do not
operate as "secret police" whose names are exempt from public disclosure.
The County next argues that the list of officers' names is exempt because
it is "essential to effective law enforcement."  The County relies on
Newman v. King County, 133 Wn.2d 565, 947 P.2d 712 (1997) in arguing that
documents are exempt for purposes of law enforcement if they meet a two-
part test.3  First, the information must be compiled by law enforcement,
and second, its nondisclosure must be essential to effective law
enforcement.  Id. at 572-73.  There is no question that the list of
officers' names was "compiled by law enforcement."  The County advances two
theories in support of its argument that nondisclosure of the officers'
names is essential to law enforcement.  First, the County asserts that
maintaining officer confidentiality is critical to the success of
undercover operations.  According to the County, all of the precautions it
takes to protect the identity of its undercover officers would be useless
if a full list of officers' names could be obtained through the act.  The
County acknowledges that Sheehan and Rosenstein did not ask the County to
identify which officers are undercover and which are not.  However, it
asserts that suspected violators of criminal law could use the list of
names to obtain officers' home addresses from other sources.  The suspected
violators could then take pictures of the officers leaving their homes, and
use the photographs to spot undercover officers that they might encounter
while engaging in criminal behavior.  Second, the County argues that
nondisclosure is also essential to officers who do not work undercover
because if they know that their
residential addresses can easily be obtained by any individual who has a
list of the names of all police officers employed by the County, they will
constantly fear for their own safety and the safety of their families.
Over time, the County contends that this will induce a state of "hyper-
vigilance" that will deplete the officers' "perceptual resources," placing
the officers in a double-bind, because they must constantly face the
possibility that angry suspects will threaten their families.
There can be no doubt that the threats faced each day by police officers
are real, and that police officers and their families experience stress as
a result of the dangers inherent in the occupation.  We sympathize with
these concerns; indeed, we empathize with them, for judges are not immune
from threats by angry litigants.  We also are not insulated from news
reports about physicians who perform abortions being identified by name and
residential address on anti-abortion web sites and subsequently being
murdered, and are not so nave as to believe that police officers who are
identified on anti-police web sites, such as those run by Sheehan and
Rosenstein, by name and home address, and perhaps by residential telephone
number and social security number as well, could not thereby be placed in
danger or subjected to harassment or identity theft.  Still, the County
admits that it regularly releases the names of its officers, including
undercover officers, to the legitimate news media and indeed to anyone else
who requests them, in connection with specific incidents.  Officers who are
not operating undercover disclose their own names each day, on the name
tags that they wear on their uniforms, on the tickets and citations that
they issue, to suspects whom they interrogate, to witnesses whom they
interview, and on the public record when they testify in open court -- even
undercover police officers use their real names when testifying in open
court.  The County has failed to explain why disclosure of a general list
of names pursuant to the public records act request will somehow result in
more danger and stress than all of these other individual daily
disclosures.  The County's policy of releasing officer names on a per-
incident basis, quite possibly to angry suspects with an axe to grind,
would seem to be as dangerous to police, if not more so, than releasing a
general list of all officers unconnected to any specific incident.
The County has long had a policy of routinely releasing the names, ranks,
and pay scales of its police officers to legitimate news media, upon
request.  We can only conclude that the requests of Sheehan and Rosenstein
were denied because of who these men are -- both operate controversial
websites that are critical to police, and Sheehan, at least, has heretofore
published home addresses of police officers on his web site.  Indeed, the
trial court's order reflects that the decision to require the County to
release only the surnames of its police officers was based in part on
"William Sheehan's statements regarding his intended use of the
information," as well as "balanc{ing} the interests of disclosure with the
interests in effective law enforcement."  But the act expressly states that
"{a}gencies shall not distinguish among persons requesting records, and
such persons shall not be required to provide information as to the purpose
for the request{.}  RCW 42.17.270.4  Therefore, Sheehan's intended use of
the information cannot be a basis for denying disclosure.  To conclude
otherwise would be to allow agencies to deny access to public records to
its most vocal critics, while supplying the same information to its
friends.
The trial court's balancing test is flawed, as well.  RCW 42.17.310(1)(d)
does not authorize a balancing of the public's right to disclosure with its
interest in effective law enforcement, nor does any other portion of the
act.  To state it another way, the act prohibits requiring persons to
provide information as to the purpose for the request, and by that same
token, it prohibits balancing that intended use against the interests in
effective law enforcement.
For all of these reasons, we reverse the trial court's ruling that the
County need only release the surnames of its police officers, and we hold
instead that the full names of police officers employed by the County are
not exempt from disclosure under the public records act based on the
exemption contained in RCW 42.17.310(1)(d).
2.   Is a list of the full names of King County police officers exempt from
disclosure under RCW 42.17.310(1)(b) on the ground that disclosure would
violate the employees' right to privacy?

Although the trial court based its ruling on RCW 42.17.310(1)(d), the
specific intelligence information/effective law enforcement exemption, the
County also argues that the list of officers' names is exempt because
disclosure would violate the officers' right to privacy.  RCW
42.17.310(1)(b) exempts from disclosure:  "Personal information in files
maintained for employees, appointees, or elected officials of any public
agency to the extent that disclosure would violate their right to privacy."
The right to privacy is invaded or violated "only if disclosure of
information about the person:  (1) {w}ould be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public."
RCW 42.17.255; PAWS II, 125 Wn.2d at 254.  In interpreting RCW 42.17.255,
the Washington Supreme Court has stated that "the right of privacy applies
'only to the intimate details of one's personal and private life,'" in
contrast to actions taking place in public.  Dale v. Dawson, 120 Wn.2d 782,
796; 845 P.2d 995 (1993); Spokane Police Guild v. Liquor Control Bd., 112
Wn.2d 30, 38, 769 P.2d 283 (1989).  The exemption applies to personal
information that employees would not normally share with strangers.
Dawson, 120 Wn.2d at 796.
     RCW 42.17.255 is based on Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 652D,
which addresses invasion of privacy.  Hearst, 90 Wn.2d at 135-36.  Thus,
sec. 652D provides useful guidance in interpreting the scope of the right:
There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to
information about the plaintiff that is already public.  Thus, there is no
liability for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiff's life that are
matters of public record, such as the date of his birth, the fact of his
marriage, his military record, the fact that he is admitted to the practice
of medicine or is licensed to drive a taxicab . . . .
Similarly, there is no liability for giving further publicity to what the
plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye.  Thus, he normally cannot
complain when his photograph is taken while he is walking down the public
street and is published in the defendant's newspaper.  Nor is his privacy
invaded when the defendant gives publicity to a business or activity in
which the plaintiff is engaged in dealing with the public.

Id., cmt. b.

There are other individuals who have not sought publicity or consented to
it, but through their own conduct or otherwise have become a legitimate
subject of public interest. . . .  The same is true as to those who are . .
. involved in judicial proceedings or other events that attract public
attention.  These persons are regarded as properly subject to the public
interest{.}

Id., cmt. f.

No Washington case has held that public employees' names are private and
subject to the personal privacy exemption.  Washington's public records act
contains no blanket exemption for names, as it does for addresses.  RCW
42.17.310(1)(u) exempts from disclosure "{t}he residential addresses and
residential telephone numbers of employees . . . of a public agency{.}"
Generally, however, absent such a statute so providing, lists of names and
addresses are not private.  See Annot., "Publication of Address as Well as
Name of Person as Invasion of Privacy," 84 A.L.R.3d 1159 (1978); Annot.,
"What Constitutes Personal Matters Exempt From Disclosure by Invasion of
Privacy Exemption Under State FOIA," 26 A.L.R.4th 666 (1983).
Certain federal cases have held that the privacy exemption of the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) prevents disclosure of names and addresses when
coupled with employee job classification, and salary and benefits
information.  Painting Indus. of Haw. Mkt. Recovery Fund v. United States
Dep't of Air Force, 26 F.3d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1994); Painting & Drywall
Work Preservation Fund, Inc. v. Department of Housing & Urban Dev., 936
F.2d 1300, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  And, in the law enforcement context, at
least one federal court has held that the right to privacy for officers
involved in a specific investigation outweighed the public interest in
disclosure of their names.  Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1003, 1006
(4th Cir. 1978) (holding that names of FBI agents who investigated alleged
beating of prisoner by prison guards, and name of Assistant United States
Attorney who made the decision that the alleged civil rights violation
lacked criminal prosecutive merit need not be disclosed to prisoner under
FOIA; pointing out that FOIA is not designed to supplement the rules of
civil discovery but rather to inform the public about the action of
governmental agencies).  In interpreting Washington's Public Disclosure
Act, our courts may look to the federal courts and their interpretation of
FOIA.  Bonamy v. City of Seattle, 92 Wn. App. 403, 960 P.2d 447 (1998).
However, it is important to bear in mind that  the "'state act is more
severe than the federal act in many areas.'"  PAWS II, 125 Wn.2d at 266,
quoting Hearst, 90 Wn.2d at 129.  Most significantly, unlike federal cases
interpreting FOIA, "the use of a test that balances the individual's
privacy interest against the interest of the public in disclosure is not
permitted."  Dawson, 120 Wn.2d at 795; Brouillet v. Cowles Pub'g Co., 114
Wn.2d 788, 798, 791 P.2d 526 (1990).  Under Washington's Act, both a
privacy interest and a lack of legitimate public interest must be present
to establish this exemption.  Dawson, 120 Wn.2d at 798.
The County does not argue that it is "highly offensive" merely to reveal
that a person works in law enforcement.  Rather, the County argues that
releasing the list of officers' names could allow someone to track down
their home addresses and other personal, nondisclosable information from
other sources, which if published would be highly offensive.  The County
concedes that releasing a list of names of its officers might not amount to
an invasion of privacy for most people, or even most public employees, but
contends that law enforcement officers are different because public
identification could lead to harassment and danger in their personal lives.
The County relies largely on Tacoma Pub. Library v. Woessner, 90 Wn. App.
205, 951 P.2d 357, 972 P.2d 932 (1998) in support of its argument.  In that
case, Woessner asked the Tacoma Public Library to disclose records
featuring employees' rates of pay, benefits, and pension contributions.
This information was organized in city records by employee name and
identification number.  Id. at 210.  The Library provided the records with
employee names and identification numbers redacted, based on the privacy
exemption contained in RCW 42.17.255.  Id.  The Library argued that
disclosure of an employee's name coupled with his or her identification
number would permit access to other exempt personal information, such as
the employee's social security number, home address, and telephone number,
by anyone logging onto a City of Tacoma computer.  Division Two of this
court held that release of employee names is not highly offensive, if not
coupled with employee identification numbers:
{R}elease of employees' identification numbers would be highly offensive,
because disclosure could lead to public scrutiny of individuals concerning
information unrelated to any governmental operation and impermissible
invasions of privacy . . . .  But release of employee names would not be
similarly offensive or lead to such invasions of privacy; rather,
disclosure of employee names would "allow public scrutiny of government."

Id. at 221-22.

Woessner could conceivably be read to support the County's "linkage"
argument -- that is, that any information, no matter how public it may be,
is nondisclosable if it could somehow lead to other, private information
tracked down from other sources.  But this reading would be far too broad
in light of the Woessner court's holding that release of public employees'
names, without more, is not highly offensive.
It is a fact of modern life in this age of technology that names can be
used to obtain other personal information from various sources, but we
conclude that this is not sufficient to prevent disclosure of the names of
police officers under the act.  Names, unlike employee numbers, are
released on a regular basis as a necessary incident of everyday life.
Police officers release their names when they put on their uniforms, pin on
their badges and name tags, and appear in public each day.  The County
routinely releases police officers' names on a per-incident basis.  We hold
that under Washington's public records act, the names of police officers,
without simultaneous release of other identifying information such as home
addresses, residential telephone numbers, and social security numbers
cannot be considered "highly offensive" under RCW 42.17.255.
The County also argues that a general list of the names of law enforcement
officers is not a matter of legitimate public interest, because such a list
is unrelated to a specific incident.  The County relies largely on In re
Request of Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 611, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) for the
proposition that the basic purpose and policy of Ch. 42.17 RCW is "to allow
public scrutiny of government, rather than to promote scrutiny of
particular individuals who are unrelated to any governmental operation.'"
The County also relies on another statement from Rosier:  "{A}n individual
has a privacy interest whenever information which reveals unique facts
about those named is linked to an identifiable individual."  Id. at 613.
According to the County, a citizen requesting an officer's name connected
with a specific incident does have a legitimate public interest in knowing
the name because it is related to a governmental operation, whereas this
can never be true with a general list of names.
But police officers are public employees, paid with public tax dollars.
They are granted a great deal of power, authority, and discretion in the
performance of their duties.  Amici Media Associations provide examples of
investigative reporting based in significant part on information obtained
from public records containing the names of police officers, including news
stories about the high cost of overtime pay to deputy sheriffs and jail
custodians employed by Snohomish County, Washington, the high cost of
settlement of claims of excessive use of force by police in Boise, Idaho,
and a massive investigation by the Washington Post comparing the incidence
of police shootings in Washington, D.C., with that in other large cities --
including information obtained from public records reflecting that a
disproportionately high number of shootings were by new recruits following
a crash hiring program mandated by Congress in which 1,500 new officers
were graduated from the police academy and placed on the streets,
admittedly without adequate screening, training, and post-academy
supervision.  The legitimate media utilize lists containing names of police
officers to track over time how well individual officers are performing
their jobs, whether they participate in continuing police training and
education programs, and to safeguard against corruption and abusive use of
authority.  These actions are undoubtedly related to governmental
operations and a legitimate matter of public concern.  Yet, in apparent
recognition of the fact that the County could not properly distinguish
between the legitimate media and Sheehan and Rosenstein, after the County
denied the requests of Sheehan and Rosenstein for the lists here at issue,
it also denied a similar request from The Seattle Times.
The expansive views on the scope of privacy expressed in Rosier and relied
on by the County were legislatively overruled by the Legislature the
following year, when it placed an express and narrow definition of privacy
into the act.  In so doing, the Legislature intended to restore "the law
relating to the release of public records largely to that which existed
prior to the Washington Supreme Court decision in In re Rosier."  Laws of
1987, ch. 403; sec. 1, p. 1546; RCWA 42.17.255.  See PAWS II, 125 Wn.2d at
258-59 (recognizing that the Legislature, by post-Rosier amendments to the
act, specifically overturned the Rosier court's interpretation of general
language in the procedural section of the act concerning personal privacy
to create a general personal privacy exemption).
We understand the County's desire to protect its police officers from harm
that could follow from publication by Sheehan and Rosenstein on their web
sites of information that would violate the officers' rights of privacy,
such as their home addresses, home telephone numbers, social security
numbers and similar private information.  We observe that the Legislature
has, from time to time, adopted new exemptions to the public records act.
See PAWS II, 125 Wn.2d at 258, n.6 (noting that number of exemptions had
increased from 10 in the initiative passed in 1973, to 40-odd by 1995).
Certainly, the Legislature could amend the act to add exemptions crafted to
address abuses that the County believes will follow if it is required to
disclose the names of its police officers.  But in keeping with the mandate
of the act for full disclosure in the absence of a specific exemption, the
Legislature sometimes addresses abuses by enacting anti-harassment statutes
aimed specifically at harassers, rather than by enacting exemptions that
would erode the broad mandate of the act for broad public disclosure of
public records.5
While this appeal was pending, the Legislature passed and the Governor
signed into law a new statute now found at RCW 4.24.680-.700.  RCW 4.24.680
makes it
unlawful, with the intent to harm or intimidate, to sell, trade, give,
publish, distribute or otherwise release the residential address,
residential telephone number, birthdate or social security number of any
law enforcement-related, corrections officer-related, or court-related
employee or volunteer and categorize them as such, without the express
written permission of the employee or volunteer, unless specifically
exempted by law or court order.  RCW 4.24.690 permits the prosecuting
attorney or any person harmed by an alleged violation of the preceding
section to seek injunctive relief to abate and prevent the continuance or
recurrence of the violation.  And RCW 4.24.700 permits law enforcement-
related, corrections officer-related or court-related employees or
volunteers who suffer damages as a result of a person or organization
violating the provisions of section .680 to bring a lawsuit for actual
damages sustained plus attorney fees and costs.  The Senate Bill Reports
for SB 6700 in its various iterations, by which these new sections
originated, reflect that the new statute was enacted because an (unnamed)
individual who is critical of law enforcement personnel had published the
names, residential addresses, residential telephone numbers, birth dates,
social security numbers and other personal information about police
officers and their relatives, over the internet.  We observe that if our
Legislature had intended the names of police officers to be exempt from
disclosure under the public records act, it is unlikely that it would have
enacted these new statutes.
In sum, the trial court erred by requiring the County to disclose only the
surnames of its police officers.  We reverse and remand for entry of an
order requiring the County to release the full names and ranks of the
officers as contained in the public records here at issue.
3.  Did the trial court err in awarding Sheehan and Rosenstein the full
amount of their attorney fees requested?

Our ruling that that the trial court should have required the County to
disclose the full names and ranks of its police officers effectively moots
the County's challenge to the trial court's award of attorney fees and
costs to Sheehan and Rosenstein on the basis that they prevailed only
partially at the trial court level.  Accordingly, we will not address that
issue.  But we will address the County's contention that Sheehan and
Rosenstein should not receive the full amount of the fees they requested
because they worked together in defending the lawsuit and their legal
research and briefing was redundant and duplicative.  This argument is not
convincing.  The County fails to point to any specific facts in the record
to support its allegation.  Furthermore, since Rosenstein's motion to
intervene was granted, he and Sheehan have submitted joint briefs.  This is
not an adequate reason to disturb the trial court's grant of attorney fees.
4.  Did the trial court err in declining to award statutory penalties under
RCW 42.17.340(4) on the ground that the County did not withhold the record
in bad faith?

Sheehan, Rosenstein, and amici Media Associations argue that where the
party seeking disclosure prevails, even partially, penalties are mandatory
under RCW 42.17.340(4), and that the trial court has discretion only in
setting the amount of the penalty between $5 and $100 for each day that
public records are wrongfully withheld.  Sheehan and Rosenstein (but not
Media Associations) further contend that the County withheld the records in
bad faith, and ask that this court impose the maximum statutory penalty of
$100 per day.
RCW 42.17.340(4) provides that "it shall be within the discretion of the
court to award such person an amount not less than five dollars and not to
exceed one hundred dollars for each day that he was denied the right to
inspect or copy said public record."  We first note that this statute
grants discretion to the trial court, not to this appellate court, to set
the amount of the penalty within the minimum and maximum ranges.  Our
function is to review claims of abuse of trial court discretion with
respect to the imposition or lack of imposition of a penalty, not to
exercise such discretion ourselves.  Accordingly, we summarily reject
Sheehan and Rosenstein's invitation to impose the maximum statutory
penalty.
This provision serves as a "penalty to enforce the strong public policies
underlying the public disclosure act."  Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wn.2d
25, 35-36, 929 P.2d 389 (1997); PAWS II, 125 Wn.2d at 271.  Courts have
repeatedly emphasized that "'strict enforcement'" of this provision "'will
discourage improper denial of access to public records.'"  PAWS II, 125
Wn.2d at 271, quoting Hearst, 90 Wn.2d at 140.  "The award provision does
not require a showing of bad faith for the imposition of a penalty.
Likewise, a good faith reliance on an exemption will not exonerate an
agency from the imposition of a penalty where the agency has erroneously
withheld a public record."  Amren, 131 Wn.2d at 36.  Furthermore, there is
no requirement that the agency act unreasonably for an award to be imposed.
Id. at 37.
In arguing that a penalty award is mandatory where the agency erroneously
withholds documents, Sheehan, Rosenstein and amici rely primarily on the
Washington Supreme Court's holding in Amren that "when an agency
erroneously denies a public record and a party has prevailed against the
agency in obtaining a copy of the public record an award is warranted."
Id.  The court reconfirmed this standard in Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136
Wn.2d 595, 617, 963 P.2d 869 (1998) ("We have interpreted this provision to
entitle a requester to an award if an agency erroneously denies disclosure
of a public record" (citing Amren, 131 Wn.2d at 37; emphasis added)).
Although the Supreme Court did not state explicitly in Amren or Limstrom
that the trial court lacks discretion to deny penalties altogether where an
agency erroneously denies disclosure of a public record, this court has
said that the act "mandates that the court award a penalty no less than $5
and no more than $100 per day for each day the requester was denied the
right to inspect or copy the public record."  A.C.L.U. v. Blaine Sch. Dist.
No. 503, 95 Wn. App. 106, 111, 975 P.2d 536 (1999) (emphasis added).  We
find it difficult to construe the statute any other way, for if the trial
court has discretion to set penalties within the range of not less than $5
to not more than $100 per day, it would not seem to have discretion to set
the penalties at less than $5 per day, which in turn would necessarily mean
that it does not have discretion to deny penalties altogether, where access
to the records requested was erroneously denied.6
The County relies on Lindberg v. Kitsap County, 133 Wn.2d 729, 948 P.2d 805
(1997) for the proposition that the trial court has the discretion not to
award a penalty, even where the requesting party prevails, so long as the
agency denial of access was exercised in good faith reliance on a statutory
exemption.  In Lindberg, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's order granting $1,100 to the Lindbergs for "a combination of
attorney fees and . . . award of some penalties" pursuant to RCW
42.17.340(4).  Id. at 746-47.  The trial court in that case apportioned
$602.30 for attorney fees and costs and $507.70 as an additional penalty,
but did specify the basis for calculating the penalty.  Id. at 746.  The
Washington Supreme Court rejected the Lindbergs' argument that the trial
court erred in failing to award penalties for 219 days within the
statutorily mandated range of $5 to $100 per day, holding that there was no
evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount
of the award.  Id. at 747.  The dissenting justices would have affirmed the
Court of Appeals decision remanding the matter back to the trial court for
an affirmative finding as to the number of days the Lindbergs were denied
the right to copy the engineering plans they sought, and to apply a
multiple within the statutory penalty range of not less than $5 and not
more than $100 for each day that the requested records were improperly
withheld.  Id. at 748-49.  But even the dissenting justices apparently
would have found discretion on the part of the trial court to deny an award
of penalties altogether:
Although the decision to make an award is discretionary, having exercised
its discretion, the trial court must award penalties of "not less than five
dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars" for each day that the
requested record was withheld.  These penalties are strictly enforced to
discourage improper denial of access to public records.  The Court of
Appeals correctly held that, upon the trial court's decision to award
penalties, the Lindbergs were entitled to an award within the statutory
range for each day they were denied the right to copy the engineering
plans.  The trial court erred by computing the award in a vacuum.

Lindberg, 133 Wn.2d at 748-49 (Durham, C.J. concurring in part, dissenting
in part; footnotes containing citations omitted).
We find it difficult to reconcile the Supreme Court's decisions in Amren
and Lindberg.  In Amren, the court said that the penalty provision "does
not require a showing of bad faith for the imposition of a penalty.
Likewise, a good faith reliance on an exemption will not exonerate an
agency from the imposition of a penalty where the agency has erroneously
withheld a public record."  Amren, 131 Wn.2d at 36.  Instead, good or bad
faith is a factor for the court to consider in setting the amount of the
penalty, within the permissible statutory range.  Id. at 38.  Yet, in
Lindberg, where the trial court found that the agency reasonably relied in
good faith on its legal counsel's erroneous advice that it could not permit
copying of copyrighted engineering plans under the federal Copyright Act,
the majority affirmed a penalty award that seems to have been less than $5
per day based on the trial court's finding of good faith, and the
dissenting justices seemingly would have approved the denial of any penalty
award whatsoever, although they did not approve an award of less than $5
per day, once the trial court found that some penalty was warranted.7  With
all due respect, our Supreme Court needs to clarify the ambiguity in the
law that is created by these two cases:  Either an agency's good faith but
erroneous reliance on a statutory exemption permits the trial court to deny
any penalty whatsoever (or to impose a penalty of less than $5 per day as
seemingly was the result if not the explicit holding in Lindberg) or it
does not, as seemingly was the holding in Amren.
We nevertheless must decide the issue now, without the benefit of Supreme
Court clarification.  We believe that the seeming conflict between these
two cases may arise from the failure of the parties in Lindberg to point
out to the Court that the Legislature amended RCW 42.17.340 in 1992.  See
Laws of 1992, ch. 139 sec. 8.  Before the amendment, RCW 42.17.340(3)
provided that in addition to mandatory costs and attorney fees, "it shall
be within the discretion of the court to award such person an amount not to
exceed twenty-five dollars for each day that he was denied the right to
inspect or copy said public record."  (Emphasis added).  It is
understandable why courts construing that language would conclude that the
trial court had discretion to deny any penalty award whatsoever, even when
the agency erred in concluding that it need not release the record.  See,
e.g., Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham, 64 Wn. App. 295, 299, 825 P.2d 324
(1992) ("RCW 42.17.340(3) clearly places the decision of whether to grant a
statutory award, as well as the determination of the amount of the award
`within the discretion of the trial court'").  By way of the 1992
amendment, the Legislature inserted a new subsection (2), redesignated
former subsections (2) and (3) as (3) and (4), added a new sentence to
subsection (3), and rewrote the resulting subsection (4) so that it now
reads as follows:
Any person who prevails against an agency in any action in the courts
seeking the right to inspect or copy any public record or the right to
receive a response to a public record request within a reasonable amount of
time shall be awarded all costs, including reasonable attorney fees,
incurred in connection with such legal action.  In addition, it shall be
within the discretion of the court to award such person an amount not less
than five dollars and not to exceed one hundred dollars for each day that
he was denied the right to inspect or copy the public record.

(Emphasis added).  We conclude that by so amending the statute, the
Legislature limited trial court discretion, so that a penalty of at least
$5 per day is now mandatory where an agency erroneously withholds a public
record, whether or not the agency acted in good faith reliance upon a
statutory exemption that is not in fact applicable.  In so ruling, we rely
upon the fact and content of the 1992 amendment to the statute, and upon
the Supreme Court's soundly-reasoned opinion in Amren.
Here, the trial court declined to award penalties, despite the fact that
Sheehan and Rosenstein prevailed on the major issue of disclosing last
names, based on its finding that that the County acted in good faith.
However, "a good faith reliance on an exemption will not exonerate an
agency from the imposition of a penalty where the agency has erroneously
withheld a public record."  Amren, 131 Wn.2d at 36.  As this court
explained in A.C.L.U. v. Blaine School District (construing the amended
version of the statute):
Agencies are sometimes placed in a difficult position concerning the
disclosure of documents that may violate a third party's right to privacy,
rights under another law, or rights under the attorney-client privilege or
work product doctrine.  Yet, even when agencies are faced with the
conflicting interests of complying with the act and protecting third party
rights, the act requires that courts impose penalties for the wrongful
withholding of documents.

A.C.L.U. v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 95 Wn. App. at 111.  (Emphasis added).
Therefore, even assuming that the County did act in good faith, the trial
court abused its discretion in denying an award of penalties.
The only question is the proper amount.  "Although a showing of bad faith
or economic loss is not required in the determination of whether an award
for delay in disclosure should be granted, they are factors for the trial
court to consider in determining the amount to be awarded."  Amren, 131
Wn.2d at 37.  The existence or absence of bad faith is the principal factor
in determining the amount of penalty to be imposed.  Yacobellis, 64 Wn.
App. at 303.  In A.C.L.U. v. Blaine School District, this court held that a
penalty of $10 per day was appropriate where it was clear that the agency
did not act in good faith in withholding the records.  95 Wn. App. at 115.
In making this determination, we observed that the agency's refusal to
disclose the requested records was not motivated by a desire to protect a
third party's rights, but rather to avoid the cost and inconvenience of
complying.  Id. at 114.
There is no similar evidence of bad faith here.  While the County may
dislike Sheehan and his incendiary web site, the County's refusal to
disclose the full names of its police officers appears primarily to have
been motivated by a desire to protect their safety and privacy -- and it is
undisputed that Sheehan had, in fact, previously published police officers'
home addresses on his web site.  The County made its decision before the
Legislature enacted RCW 4.24.680-.700, so that the County did not have an
alternate means of attempting to preserve its officers' privacy.  Although
we do not find the County's arguments against disclosure to be persuasive,
they are not so farfetched as to constitute bad faith.  Therefore, we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
County acted in good faith.  But remand is necessary because good faith
does not justify failing to impose at least the minimum statutory penalty
of $5 per day.
CONCLUSION

Sheehan and Rosenstein's web sites are controversial, incendiary, and
offensive to many.  Nevertheless, the public records act requires agencies
to ignore the identity of the requester, and to focus on the information
itself in determining whether it is exempt from disclosure.  Neither of the
statutory exemptions relied upon by the County apply to the requests for
disclosure in this case.  The trial court erred in ordering that the County
could withhold the first and middle names (or initials where the officers
are so identified in the public record) of its law enforcement personnel.
And the trial court erred in failing to impose at least the minimum
statutory penalty of $5 per day, notwithstanding that its finding of good
faith by the County is supported by the record.  The trial court did not
err in awarding Sheehan and Rosenstein the full amount of their attorney
fees and costs.
RCW 42.17.340(4) also entitles Sheehan and Rosenstein to their reasonable
attorney fees on appeal.  PAWS I, 114 Wn.2d at 690-91; PAWS II, 125 Wn.2d
at 271; RAP 18.1.  We so order.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the imposition of a
penalty as provided in RCW 42.17.340(4) and this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

1 By requiring the County to disclose the "full names" of its police
officers, we mean the full name as listed on the records themselves.  To
use a hypothetical example (with apologies to the late, great American poet
of the same name), if an officer is listed on the records as "T. S. Eliot"
only that name need be disclosed.  The County is not required to prepare a
new record identifying the hypothetical officer as "Thomas Stearns Eliot."
Cf., Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wn.2d 595, 605, 963 P.2d 869 (1998) (public
records act does not require agency to go outside its own records and
resources to try to identify or locate the record requested).
2 While this appeal was pending, the County sent the appellants a 22-page
list of ranks, containing no names, however.  A commissioner of this court
had, by then, issued an order staying enforcement of the order that King
County release the last names of its police officers pending the outcome of
this appeal.
3 It is important to note that in Newman, the parties did not dispute that
the requested documents were "specific investigative records."  And neither
party argued that they were "intelligence information."  Therefore, the
test formulated by the Newman court did not mention those critical portions
of the statutory language.
4 The court's order also runs counter to the Washington State Attorney
General's official publication interpreting the Act:  "A decision to permit
inspection {of public records} cannot be based on the identity of the
requester or the stated purpose, if any, of the request.  If a record is
available to one, it is available to all.  The decision must be based on
the content of the record itself, not on the `need to know' of a particular
requester."  Attorney General's Office, Overview of Public Records (1995),
at 10.
5 One such anti-harassment statute is RCW 4.24.580 which permits
individuals who own or are employed at research, educational or
agricultural production facilities that use animals for research to apply
for injunctive relief to prevent harassment by persons or organizations
whose intent is to stop or modify the use of animals in research by means
that would cause injury to the person or property of the recipient.  See
PAWS II, 125 Wn.2d at 263-64 (holding that researchers may seek to enjoin
the release of certain portions of public records sought under the public
records act, including the names of researchers, if the nondisclosure of
those portions is necessary to prevent harm or injury to persons or
property and the criteria of the anti-harassment statute is properly
invoked and its criteria met).
6 But see Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham, 64 Wn. App. 295, 301, 825 P.2d
324 (1992), in which this court, construing a former version of the penalty
statute stated that the provision "clearly places the decision of whether
to grant a statutory award, as well as the determination of the amount of
the award, `within the discretion of the {trial} court.'"  Id. at 299.  The
Yacobellis court further stated that "when the governmental agency itself
has denied disclosure based on its own erroneous interpretation of the
public disclosure act or its exemptions, the trial court is within its
discretion in imposing an award under this provision."  Id. at 302.  The
Yacobellis court's reasoning was abrogated in part by the Supreme Court in
Amren, 131 Wn.2d at 37, n.10, wherein the court disavowed the notion that
an agency must act unreasonably in order for a penalty to be imposed, and
said, "Moreover, to require unreasonable conduct as the standard for award
of penalties would be inconsistent with the strong policy of the Act to
discourage improper denial of access to public records."
7 The number of days that the records were erroneously withheld in Lindberg
was disputed, but it is nevertheless clear that the trial court's award of
$507.70 was either drawn from thin air or based on something less than $5
per day, in that the Lindbergs were not permitted to copy the engineering
plans for something close to 219 days.  See Lindberg, 133 Wn.2d at 737-38.
The dispute about the number of days was based on the fact that both Evelyn
Lindberg and her father Richard Lindberg made requests for the engineering
plans, some days apart, so that the number of days the records were
withheld would depend in part upon whether the requests were treated
together or as overlapping.  In addition, the agency had permitted the
Lindbergs to view the engineering plans, though not to photocopy them,
perhaps raising an issue of fact as to the degree to which they were denied
access to the record.  See Lindberg v. Kitsap County, 82 Wn. App. 566, 919
P.2d 89 (1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 133 Wn.2d
729 (1997).  Nevertheless, RCW 42.17.340(4) prescribes a penalty for each
day that the person is "denied the right to inspect or copy said public
record."  (Emphasis added).


Clicking on the above picture will take you to a page about the webmaster.
In Nov 2002, the Wa St Court of Appeals, ruled that government employees names cannot be kept secret.
These webpages were uploaded for my amusement, but also for these reasons.
e-mail--- welcome
here's some e-mail questions, comments, and my replies